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When will the oil and gas industry recover? That is the question
that has been asked throughout the industry for nearly four years now.
The indicators of the health of the industry are not improving but
instead are declining. The prices of oil and gas continue their downward
spiral; the price of oil is considerably below its level a year ago, and
natural gas prices are in the low $2.00 range or below for new sales.
The Hughes rig count for Louisiana stood at 249 on October 21, 1985,
down from 311 a year ago.' There is considerably less leasing activity
in the state, and lease values are much, much lower than a few years
ago. Perhaps as a result of these conditions the focus of the cases is
over somewhat different matters than a few years ago.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There was no significant legislation regarding mineral rights in the
1985 session of the Louisiana Legislature. Two acts might be noted.
Act 325 permits the filing of a declaration of an agreement for the
exploitation of mineral interests rather than filing the full agreement. 2
The declaration will serve as full and complete notice of the agreement
to the same extent as if the original agreement had been filed and
recorded. Also of interest is Act 980 which slightly modifies the program
for leasing of state lands. 3 In the past, a person wishing to obtain a
mineral lease on state-owned lands applied with a $300 payment. The
land was then put up for competitive bidding, and the original applicant
got his deposit back if the applicant bid upon the lease. The new act
makes the application fee nonrefundable but reduces the amount to
$200.
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Oil & Gas J. 158 (Oct. 28, 1985).
2. Amending La. R.S. 9:2732-2733 (Supp. 1985).
3. Amending La. R.S. 30:125-126 (Supp. 1985).
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CONVEYANCE PROBLEMS: INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
A. Creation of Mineral Servitude Not Effected by "Subject To"
Provision in Conveyance of Land
A conveyance of land "subject to reservation of minerals" does not
have the effect of creating a mineral servitude where one does not exist,
only the effect of recognizing rights previously in existence. Parol evi-
dence is not admissible to show another intent, and the elements of
estoppel, including justifiable reliance and a change in position to one's
detriment because of the reliance, must be present for estoppel to apply.
These were the holdings in Texaco, Inc. v. Newton and Rosa Smith
Charitable Trust.4
Texaco, Inc. brought a concursus proceeding to determine ownership
of a one-half mineral interest in a five-hundred acre tract of land.
Claimants were the landowners and the Newton and Rosa T. Smith
Charitable Trust (Trust). A mineral servitude for one-half the minerals
had been conveyed to the Trust in 1958. All activities which would serve
to interrupt prescription terminated in 1965, and thus the servitude
terminated ten years later, in 1975. In 1976 the then owners of the land
sold it to the predecessors in title of the landowners in this litigation,
with the statement that the real property was conveyed "subject to:
. . .(3) A reservation of one-half (1/2) of the oil, gas and other minerals
under the real property conveyed in favor of the NEWTON AND ROSA
T. SMITH CHARITABLE TRUST . . . ." The Trust contended this
created a new servitude in its favor. The landowners argued this merely
recognized the outstanding servitude. The trial court held for the land-
owners and the trust appealed.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the second circuit held
that the phrase "subject to" recognizes rights previously in existence
rather than creates new rights. Parol evidence was not admissible to
show a different intent. The doctrine of estoppel was not applicable
because there was no showing of a change in position in reliance on a
1980 "ratification" of the 1976 "reservation" in favor of the trust.
The court was entirely correct in its approach. If the "subject to"
language does not create a new right, then what is its purpose in the
conveyance? It limits the warranty as to minerals which would otherwise
be present.' The distinction the court is making here is the difference
between words which create and words which merely limit. The phrase
"subject to" does not grant or create, it merely limits the warranty as
to the conveyance. To allow parol evidence to show a contrary intent
4. 471 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).




would undermine titles, since title examiners would be left without a
reasonable basis for rendering title opinions as to the effect of convey-
ances containing the phrase of "subject to."
B. Warranty: Waiver in Sale of Royalty Where Quantum Delivered
Is Less Than Described in Deed
A warranty question was involved in the case of Callon Royalty
Fund-1980 v. Walker.6 The Walkers conveyed by royalty deed certain
interests to Callon Royalty Fund-1980 and Pacific Royalty Fund-1980.
The deed stated it was the intent of the grantor to convey 4.51 net
royalty acres which was to be all of the grantors' interest in the lands
described. But it also stated that grantors' warranty even as to return
of purchase price was limited to defense for any act committed by
grantor which would impair warranty rights. After the conveyance it
was learned that there was a certain royalty right outstanding which
meant that grantors could only convey 3.77 royalty acres. The purchasers
brought an actidn seeking as damages a diminution in the purchase
price. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The purchasers appealed, but the court of appeal affirmed.
The first circuit held that the warranty was waived by the deed
itself. Even though the Louisiana Civil Code provides that the obligation
of delivery is a separate obligation from warranting the thing sold, 7 the
obligation of delivery was not breached here since the grantors did
convey the royalty which they owned. The effect of the provisions of
the Civil Code concerning warranties8 was superseded by the parties'
agreement specifically indicating no return of purchase price. There was
no genuine issue for trial.
C. Leasing: Grounds for Dishonoring Bank Drafts Given as Lease
Bonus
A trio of cases, Watson v. Manual,9 Reed v. Flame Petroleum,
Inc., 10 and Toler v. Pacific International Petroleum, Inc.," all involve
a common situation in the oil and gas business. People interested in
acquiring leases will give the lessor a bank draft that is subject to title
examination as to the property leased. In many instances, the lessee
wishes to ascertain that he is getting what he is paying for-a valid
lease; being able to dishonor the draft saves him from having to go
6. 461 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 2475.
8. La. Civ. Code arts. 2504-2505.
9. 467 So. 2d 15 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
10. 469 So. 2d 1217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
11. 465 So. 2d 925 (La App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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back and seek recoupment of a bonus paid under a breach of warranty
claim. In such a circumstance, the title examination provision is a
condition that the bonus is payable only if title is free from defect. In
some instances, however, lessees may seek to dishonor the draft for
reasons unrelated to the state of the title to the property. It may be
that the lessee's assessment of the value of the property has changed,
or the lessee is unable to find another party from whom he can raise
the money for payment of the bonus draft. In such an instance, the
assertion of a title problem may be made by the lessee to back out of
an agreement that now appears less advantageous than at its inception.
1. Existence of Collateral Mortgage as Ground for Rejection of
Title
At issue in Toler v. Pacific International Petroleum, Inc., was a
claim by the lessors for payment of an additional bonus for a top lease
upon expiration of the base lease and upon "approval of title." The
Tolers leased 47 acres of land for oil and gas development in 1978 for
a primary term of five years. In October, 1981 they granted a top lease
with a primary term of five years from March 21, 1983 (the end of
the primary term of the existing or base lease) on the same land to
Pacific International Petroleum for a bonus of $23,500. A side agreement
provided that Pacific International would pay an additional bonus of
$117,500 upon approval of title, but not later than ten days from March
21, 1983, and the Tolers were given a draft in this amount. When the
base lease terminated, Pacific International refused to honor the draft,
on the ground that there was a $55,000 mortgage on the property. The
Tolers brought this action against Pacific International to recover the
amount due. The trial court granted summary judgment for the lessors.
Pacific International appealed, and the second circuit affirmed the court
below. The court held that the existence of the collateral mortgage did
not provide legal justification for the disapproval of the Tolers' title
where the price to be paid was far more than sufficient to satisfy the
mortgage debt.
2. Consent to Lease Inferred from Actions of Lessee
A lessee dishonoring a bonus payment draft which was payable
subject to approval of the lease was held to be improper when the lessee
recorded the lease in Reed v. Flame Petroleum, Inc. The first circuit
held that even though the lessee had not signed the lease, consent to lease could
be inferred from its actions.
Defendant, Flame Petroleum, gave plaintiff a bank draft as bonus
for execution of an oil and gas lease on February 4, 1982, subject to
approval of both the lease and the title. The lease was to terminate on
March 1, 1982, unless drilling was commenced or rental payments were
[Vol. 46
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made. On March 11, 1982 the defendant dishonored the draft. Plaintiff
brought suit to recover the money for the bonus. Defendant denied the
existence of the lease on the grounds it had not been signed and approval
had never been granted. The trial court held for plaintiff, and defendant
appealed. Holding that the lessee's consent to the lease could be inferred
from its recordation, notwithstanding the fact it was not signed or
otherwise approved, the court of appeal affirmed. The title disapproval
was after the lease had already terminated by its own terms.
3. Draft for Bonus for Lease Not Improperly Dishonored Where
Title Question Existed
In Watson v. Manual, another decision from the first circuit (though
from a different panel), a company giving a draft as the bonus for a
lease with a stipulation that the payor had thirty days in which to
examine title was held to be able to dishonor properly the draft when
it appears that a genuine title issue exists as to the ability of the lessors
to lease.
Defendant, Mineral Exchange, Inc., sought to lease property from
plaintiffs, Charles and Amber Watson. It paid for a lease with a draft
providing that payor had thirty days for title examination. The primary
term of another lease that had burdened the property had expired prior
to the issuance of the draft, but it developed that a portion of the
property might be in a unit which could have held the entire lease
beyond the end of the primary term. Defendant dishonored the draft.
The Watsons brought suit claiming that dishonoring the draft was im-
proper, since the defendant had undertaken to cure the title defects.
The trial court held for plaintiffs and defendant appealed. The appellate
court reversed. The existence of a lease on the public records indicated
that there was a title problem. The burden of undertaking curative work
was on the lessors, and this burden had not been assumed by lessee.
The condition that the draft was to be collected only after title ex-
amination constituted a condition of the lease that the bonus was payable
only if title were free from defect. The "proportionate reduction" clause
of the lease had no application to the controversy.
The three cases summarized here are not inconsistent. In Watson,
the court found that a genuine issue as to title existed that warranted
dishonoring the draft. In Flame, the lease term had already lapsed prior
to the discovery of a title defect and the dishonor of the draft; moreover,
the lessee had acted as though the lease had come into existence, not
that its existence was dependent upon a condition. In Toler, the claim
of a title defect (because of the existence of a mortgage on the property)
was not justified where the lessor could easily cure the defect. Thus,
the thrust of these three recent decisions is to the effect that when a
bank draft is given as bonus for the execution of a lease subject to
1986]
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approval of title, the lessee may dishonor the draft within the period
specified if a genuine issue exists as to the validity of the title, but may
not dishonor the draft when there is no reasonable basis for disapproving
of title.
D. Limitation of Warranty; Cover-All Clause
In Bergeron v. Amoco Production Co.12 a cover-all clause in a lease
granted in 1976 was held to apply to the interests of two brothers in
land inherited from their father in 1954, though the interest had not
been described in the lease because it was believed the interest belonged
to their mother. The mother's lease on this interest had contained a
warranty clause which limited the warranty to return of royalties, and
this provision was held not to cover the brothers' interest once they
inherited her rights under the lease.
Lester and Bennett Bergeron, the two brothers, and their mother,
Caroline Bergeron, granted four leases covering six contiguous tracts of
land. These were later acquired by Amoco and Gulf. One lease, granted
by the mother alone, covered a forty-acre tract. After her death, which
occurred soon after the lease was granted, the brothers learned that she
had only owned 513/2880ths and that they had actually owned 2367/
2880ths at the time the lease was granted. They had inherited 2367/
2880 from their father in 1954 and then inherited their mother's interest.
They brought suit against Amoco and Gulf contending the 2367/2880
interest was not subject to a lease. The lessees counterclaimed for a
declaration that the brothers' interest was covered by the warranty clause
in the mother's lease which they had inherited from her or by the cover-
all clause in another lease which the brothers had granted as to their
undivided interest in a contiguous tract.
The federal district court held for the plaintiffs on their claim that
the warranty clause of their mother's lease did not cover their 2367/
2880ths interest, but it held for the lessees on their counterclaim that
the cover-all clause in another lease operated to bind the brothers' 2367/
2880ths interest. The mother's warranty of title was limited to the
obligation to return to the lessee any royalties received from the portion
of the leased premises to which title failed; the brothers were not parties
to her lease and had no obligation to defend title to her lease or to
maintain peaceful possession in the lessees under that lease. But the
lease by the brothers on an undivided interest in a contiguous tract
contained a cover-all clause which operated to include under lease all
land owned by the brothers in the sections of land covered by the lease.
It was the clear intent of the brothers to lease any and all interest they
12. 602 F. Supp. 551 (M.D. La. 1984).
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had in any of the six tracts. Thus, the lease required reformation to
reflect the intent of the parties.
The courts generally look with some disfavor on the cover-all clause
in oil and gas leases. 3 The court in Bergeron discusses ably the law on
the subject to indicate that the Louisiana precedents do not reflect quite
the same reluctance to give effect to the clause as is found in other
courts.' 4 It is worth noting that the court goes on to require a reformation
of the lease to give effect to the intent of the parties.
OTHER CONTRACT AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. Letter Agreements Guaranteeing Well Costs of Non-Operators
under Joint Venture Operating Agreement: Exception of Prematurity
where Creditor Has Brought Suit Against Guarantor without First
Bringing Suit Against Defaulting Non-Operator
In Terra Resources v. Federated Energy Commission [sic],' 5 the court
held that an exception of prematurity of suit would not be granted
where the terms of letter agreements bythe defendant, guaranteeing well
costs of two non-operators in oil wells, are ambiguous as to whether
suit must first be pursued against the defaulting non-operators. Terra
Resources (Terra) brought suit against Federated Energy Corporation
(Federated) when Federated failed to pay the costs of two defaulting
non-operators in two wells pursuant to two letter agreements between
Terra and Federated. The agreements provided that Federated would
stand liable for the well costs of the two, stating that "all invoices
which may become delinquent for a period more than 60 days from
the invoice date thereof, shall become the responsibility of FEC to pay
A later addendum provided that "Terra will use all legal means
at its disposal to collect all monies due [from the two others] so that
FEC's liability under this agreement will be minimized." The two non-
operators failed to pay, so Terra sent invoices to Federated, which paid
$499,199.98 on the non-operators' behalf and then refused to make
further payments. Federated, in response to Terra's suit, filed an ex-
ception of prematurity on the ground that the agreement required Terra
to exhaust all litigation against the two non~operators before it could
recover from Federated. This exception was maintained by the trial
court. On Terra's appeal, the fourth circuit reversed and remanded. The
13. H. Williams & C. Meyers, I Oil and Gas Law § 221.3 (Supp. 1984).
14. Melancon v. Melancon, 199 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Williams v.
Bowie Lumber Co., 214 La. 750, 38 So. 2d 729 (1948); O'Meara v. Broussard, 162 So.
2d 777 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963). Distinguished was United Gas Public Service Co. v.
Mitchell, 188 La. 651, 177 So. 697 (1937), on the ground that the rights of third parties
had intervened.
15. 465 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 So. 2d 1212 (La. 1985).
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addendum reference to use of "all legal means," said the court, does
not mean that Federated has no obligation to pay pending use of all
legal means. Because of the ambivalence or ambiguity of the addendum,
the case was remanded for the trial court to inquire into the circumstance
showing the parties' intentions.
B. Lessors Indispensable Parties in Suit on Validity of Lease;
Partition; Ambiguity, Inappropriateness of Summary Judgment
In Celt Oil, Inc. v. Jackson, 6 the court held that summary judgment
is inappropriate where there is ambiguity as to the interpretation of a
partition agreement and there exists a genuine issue of fact. The court
also held that lessors are indispensable parties when litigating the validity
of a lease which they granted.
The plaintiffs in Celt Oil were owners of a mineral lease from the
Mileys, and they sought a declaration as to the validity of the lease as
to a twenty-foot strip of land between adjacent tracts of their lessors
and the defendants. Ownership of the strip turned on interpretation of
a partition agreement between two brothers who were ancestors in title
to the lessors and the defendants. The trial court gave summary judgment
for the defendants based on its interpretation of the partition agreement.
The plaintiffs appealed. In reversing and remanding, the first circuit
said the partition agreement was ambiguous. There was a genuine issue
of fact to be resolved, and summary judgment was thus inappropriate.
The lessors were never made parties to the litigation; they were indis-
pensable parties so they had to be joined as parties.
C. Gas Balancing Agreement; Obligation to Account after Reservoir
Depletion
In Chevron U. S. A., Inc. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 7 the owner
of a one-eighth royalty who had elected to take royalty in-kind was
held by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to have no
right to a cash balancing after reservoir depletion when the gas balancing
agreement it had entered into provided only for in-kind balancing, and
the royalty owner had failed to market its share of the gas prior to
depletion.
Chevron had farmed-out an oil and gas lease on federal offshore
lands to Belco, reserving a one-eighth overriding royalty. Belco's op-
erations resulted in gas production which Belco sold to Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company. Chevron elected to take its royalty in-kind rather
than to accept an offer of payment in cash from Belco. In 1975, Chevron
and Belco entered into a balancing agreement. Chevron agreed to sell
16. 469 So. 2d 261 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985).
17. 755 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 140 (1985).
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its gas to Tennessee Gas Pipeline also, but it did not receive authority
for such sale from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission until
October, 1979, four months after the field had stopped producing.
Chevron demanded an accounting from Belco for one-eighth of the
proceeds of Belco's sales from the field. Belco refused on the ground
that the balancing agreement did not provide for such an accounting.
Applying Louisiana law and using equitable principles of unjust
enrichment, the federal district court ruled in favor of Chevron for
$619,052.85. Belco appealed. The fifth circuit reversed. The balancing
agreement provided the exclusive means for Chevron and Belco to bring
their balance into account, an in-kind taking. The parties did not leave
open the possibility that cash balancing might nonetheless be used. The
contract itself allocated the risk of depletion to the out-of-balance party.
The equitable claim of unjust enrichment cannot supersede the contrary
terms of the contract, said the court. The balancing agreement was not
a "loan for consumption" under article 2910 of the Louisiana Civil
Code since Chevron did not deliver gas to Belco in exchange for Belco's
obligation to repay; rather, Chevron had a call on production to the
partial exclusion of Belco until the accounts were balanced.
At the risk of restating the obvious, the fifth circuit in Chevron v.
Belco is applying Louisiana law to an agreement arising under a farm-
out of a federal lease, and the court is simply applying its interpretation
of the balancing agreement, not a theory of ownership of gas in Lou-
isiana law. It is important that this be noted for there is an analagous
problem in Louisiana, as well as other states, growing out of operating
agreements, unit agreements, and unit orders. Since mid-1982, there have
been many wells with pipelines taking from less than all the owners in
the well or the unit. In many of these there is no balancing agreement
among the parties. There have been several orders from the Commis-
sioner of Conservation touching on the subject, and several court cases
directed at the Commissioner or at operating parties. There has as yet
been no authoritative court ruling on the obligations of a well or unit
operator towards non-operating parties who are out of balance. The
1984 Louisiana Legislature did provide that the unit operator must
account to unleased landowners requiring that if:
there is included in any unit created by the Commissioner of
Conservation one or more unleased interests for which the party
or parties entitled to market production therefrom have not
made arrangements to separately dispose of the share of such
production attributable to such tract, then the unity [sic] operator
shall pay to such party or parties such tract's pro rata share
of the proceeds of the sale of production within one hundred
eighty days of such sale.'8
18. 1984 La. Acts No. 345, amending section 10 of Title 30 of Louisiana Revised
Statutes.
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Chevron v. Belco thus does not really speak to the range of balancing
problems that can arise and in fact are now being litigated.
D. Anti-washout Clause of Sublease; Binding Effect on Sublessee
without Privity of Contract
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Robinson v. North
American Royalties, Inc.'9 held that the anti-washout provision of a
sublease is binding on the sublessee under the Louisiana Mineral Code
even though there is no privity of contract, but only to the extent of
the interest acquired by the sublessee.
The Petitjeans leased 579 acres to Robinson who thereupon subleased
the entire acreage to North American Royalties with reservation of one
percent of all production. The sublease contained an extension clause,
or "anti-washout" provision, that provided that the overriding interest
would also apply to any new mineral leases acquired by the sublessee
or its successors or assigns covering any of the 579 acres under the
original lease, if acquired within one year of the expiration of the original
lease. North American subleased to the Stone Oil Corporation sixty
percent of its interest in the Petitjean lease only insofar as the said
lease covered land located within a certain production unit established
by the Commissioner of Conservation. North American decided not to
maintain the Petitjean lease outside the unit, and thus it expired. Within
one year of the expiration, Stone took a new lease on a portion of the
Petitjean acreage that was outside the unit. Robinson made a claim
against North American, Stone, and David Bintliff that he was entitled
to a one percent interest out of this new lease under the terms of the
"anti-washout" clause.
The trial court, relying on Berman v. Brown,20 ruled in favor of
the defendants on the ground that there was "no cause and/or right
of action" for Robinson since there was no privity of contract between
him and Stone. Robinson appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and rendered judgment. The Berman case has
been overruled legislatively by Article 128 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code, 21 so that even without privity of contract the sublessee is re-
sponsible for performance to the sublessor. But this is only to the extent
of any interest acquired by the sublessee. The court ruled that since
Stone as sublessee only acquired rights in the original Petitjean lease
that were in the conservation unit, it was not bound by the anti-washout
provision as to acreage outside that unit.
19. 463 So. 2d 1384 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
20. 244 La. 619, 70 So. 2d 433, 30. & G. R. 608 (1953).
21. La. R.S. 31:128 (1951).
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E. Intervention by Lessors in Lessee-Pipeline Litigation
Several cases have concerned rights of parties claiming to benefit
from a stipulation pour autrui. The first involved a lessor's rights under
a gas purchase contract. In Amoco Production Co. v. Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp.,2" it was held that lessors-royalty owners had suf-
ficient justiciable interests relating to the enforcement of a gas purchase
contract between their lessee and a pipeline to allow their intervention
in litigation between the lessee and the pipeline over the gas purchase
contract.
Amoco, a lessee and gas producer, brought a claim against Columbia
Gas, a natural gas pipeline company, concerning performance of two
natural gas purchase contracts. Intervenors, some of Amoco's lessors
and royalty owners in a field subject to the gas purchase contracts, filed
a petition of intervention asserting that their leases entitled them to an
accounting for a portion of any benefit derived by Amoco under one
of the contracts as either additional royalty or damages. The petition
was amended to allege further that they were third-party beneficiaries
of the gas purchase contract and that Amoco and Columbia had engaged
in unfair trade practices. Amoco and Columbia both opposed the in-
tervention by filing exceptions of no right of action and asserting that
the petitions failed to state a justiciable case sufficient to allow inter-
vention. The trial court granted the exceptions. Upon the intervenor's
appeal, the fourth circuit court of appeal reversed. Under the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure,2 3 having a "justiciable right" for purposes of
intervention means the right of a party to seek redress or a remedy
against either plaintiff or defendant in the original action or both, and
those parties have a real interest in opposing it. If that right does exist,
then, in order to intervene, it must be so related or connected to the
facts or object of the principal action that a judgment on the principal
action will have a direct impact on the intervenor's rights. The court
ruled that the intervenors here met this test. This does not go to the
merits of the intervenors' claims, but simply because there may be a
valid defense on the merits does not warrant the dismissal of an inter-
vention on an exception of no right of action.
F. Liability of Lessee for Surface Damages to Farming Lessee;
Stipulation Pour Autrui
In Broussard v. Northcott Exploration Co.,24 a farming lessee under
an unrecorded surface lease sought damages from a mineral lessee for
22. 455 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 So. 2d 542, 543 (La.
1984).
23. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1091 (1960).
24. 469 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. granted, 474 So. 2d 940 (La. 1985).
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damages to his crops. The mineral lease provided that "[tihe lessee shall
be responsible for all damages caused by lessee's operations." The trial
court held that this was a stipulation pour autrui allowing the farming
lessee to recover from the mineral lessee. Reversing the trial court, the
third circuit ruled that the quoted provision only applied to the lessor's
damages, distinguishing this case from Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling
Co., where the lease language made the mineral lessee expressly liable
for "all damages" caused by his operations. 25 Liability ex delicto 6 as
a basis for damages was rejected by the court; in the absence of a
stipulation pour autrui a surface lessee under an unrecorded lease could
not recover damages from a third party holding a real right of a recorded
mineral lease.
G. Oil Well Lien Act: Prescription of Lien Privilege If Not Filed
for Record Within Ninety Days
The court in C - Craft Marine Services, Inc. v. Llog Exploration
Co. 27 held that the statutory period for filing of record a claim or
privilege in the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act28 is a prescriptive period
after which the privilege is lost. It is not a period for filing simply to
make the privilege superior to all other privileges or mortgages.
Llog Exploration Company (Llog) and Blind Bay Corporation (Blind
Bay) were joint lessees who hired Explorer Drilling to drill a well for
them. Explorer in turn contracted with C-Craft for towing and barge
services. When Explorer failed to pay C-Craft, C-Craft asserted a priv-
ilege under the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act against the well and a
working interest in the lease. Llog and Blind Bay filed exceptions to
the claim. The trial court ruled that the privilege was not filed for
record within ninety days of the performance of the services and thus
could not be asserted as having prescribed. C-Craft appealed. The fourth
circuit court of appeal affirmed. In specifying a ninety day period for
the filing of a claim or privilege, the Oil Well Lien Act was providing
a prescriptive period for the creation of a privilege, not simply providing
a time period for filing the privilege in order to make the privilege
superior to all other privileges.
It is to be noted that the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act has since
been amended to provide a 180 day period for filing of the privilege,
25. 255 La. 347, 231 So. 2d 347 (1969). The printed lease clause providing for
damages "to timber and growing crops of lessor" had been struck out and replaced by
the more expansive provision. See also, Hargroder v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,
290 So. 2d 874 (La. 1974).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
27. 470 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert denied, 472 So. 2d 921 (La. 1985).
28. La. R.S. 9:4861-4867 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
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but this should not disturb the court's holding that this is a prescriptive
period. Also, one should observe that the court has interpreted Western
Wireline Services, Inc. v. Pecos Western Corp.,29 as "overruling" the
holdings of the federal court decisions in Continental Casualty Co. v.
Associated Pipe & Supply Co.,30 and Beacon Gasoline Co. v. Sun Oil
Co." Under the Erie doctrine, there is little or no precedential impe-
diment to a state court interpreting state law differently from the federal
court.
III. LEASE MAINTENANCE
A. Shut-in Well clause
In Webb v. Hardage Corp.,3 2 the second circuit court of appeal
ruled that for a lease to be held by a shut-in well under a shut-in well
clause, the well must be shown to be capable of producing in paying
quantities prior to the end of the primary term or the continuous drilling
term. It also held that voluntary bankruptcy does not constitute force
majeure under the lease.
The plaintiffs in Webb v. Hardage leased three tracts of land under
three leases to Enerco. The five year primary term ended in 1981. At
that time there was a shallow, shut-in well on each tract. Enerco had
voluntarily gone into bankruptcy in 1978, and the leases were subse-
quently acquired by defendant Hardage Corporation. Some gas was
flared from the wells for a short period, but the intial potential test
required by the Office of Conservation was not performed; such a test
was finally performed on one well in March, 1983. When defendant
tendered shut-in royalties, they were refused by the lessors. When the
defendant attempted to perform an intial potential test on another well,
the landowner prevented it. Suit by the lessors followed seeking a dec-
laration that the leases had terminated, a temporary restraining order,
and a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant from taking any
other action with respect to the property, and attorney fees and damages.
The defendant filed a reconventional demand for a declration that the
leases were still in force. The trial court held for plaintiffs, and the
defendant appealed. In affirming, the second circuit held that just as
production must be in paying quantities to maintain a lease when there
is production," so too must a shut-in well be capable of producing in
paying quantities. The capacity to produce in paying quantities must be
29. 377 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
30. 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. 455 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. La. 1978).
32. 471 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
33. La. R.S. 31:124 (Supp. 1985).
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present at the end of the primary term or the continuous drilling op-
erations term, reasoned the court. The lessee who wishes to maintain
the lease in this manner has the burden of proving the capacity to
produce in paying quantities, and the defendant did not meet that burden
here. The fact that the original lessee went into voluntary bankruptcy
did not constitute force majeure such as to effect the extension of the
terms of the leases. The provisions of the leases for the lessee to retain
forty acres around each producing well in the event of lease cancellation
did not apply, since the wells were not producing, being worked on,
or being drilled within the meaning of the leases. Finally, the court
ruled that the lessors were entitled to the attorneys' fees awarded by
the trial court.
It may be noted that the court in Hardage did not state that the
intial potential test is the only method whereby the lessee can show that
a well is capable of production in paying quantities prior to the end
of the primary term or the continuous drilling term. But the court does
say that as a general rule such a test must be conducted in order to
maintain the lease.
B. Effect of Unit Established by Commissioner of Conservation on
Acreage Outside of Unit When Unit Well is Off Leased Tract
The pooling clause in a lease that divided the lease upon the exercise
of pooling power (if the unit well was not on the leased tract) was held
not to apply to pooling resulting from an order of the Commissioner
of Conservation in Mathews v. Goodrich Oil Co.34 The Louisiana Mineral
Code did not increase the obligations of the mineral lessee with respect
to this aspect of unitization.
The plaintiffs were successors in interest of a lessor of fifty-one
acres. The defendants held the working interest in that lease. A portion
of the tract was included in a unit formed by the Commissioner of
Conservation (upon application of the lessee), and the unit well was off
the leased tract. A new unit was created in 1982 which included thirty-
one acres of the leased tract, with the unit well located on the leased
tract. Plaintiffs brought this suit claiming the lease had already termi-
nated as to those thirty-one acres by operation of the pooling clause
of the lease and by operation of the Louisiana Mineral Code. The trial
court granted summary judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.
The second circuit affirmed.
The pooling clause in question provided for division of the lease if
a unit was established pursuant to it and the unit well was off the
leased tract. This did not apply to units created by the Commissioner
34. 471 So. 2d 938 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 So. 2d 1105 (La. 1985).
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of Conservation. Where the clause was not applicable, there was no
duty under it to furnish plaintiffs with a plat showing the unit. The
Mineral Code did not increase the burdens on the lessee to divide the
lease as to contiguous tracts, nor does the principle of reasonable de-
velopment under Mineral Code article 122 divide the lease in these
circumstances.
C. Pugh Clause, Requirement of Delay Rental for Acreage Outside
of Unit Which is Not a Voluntary Unit
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same
result as the second circuit did in Mathews v. Goodrich Oil Co. In
Lowman v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc.,35 the court held a Pugh clause requiring
payment of rentals or operations to maintain a lease as to acreage
outside a unit, applied only to voluntary units, not units established by
the Commissioner of Conservation. Thus, the lease in this case was also
maintained as to its entirety by unit operations even without payment
of shut-in rentals as to outside acreage.
Plaintiffs, lessors, brought suit in state court in Louisiana to cancel
an oil and gas lease as to acreage outside producing units established
by the Commissioner of Conservation. The suit was removed to Federal
court. The lease contained a Pugh clause requiring payment of delay
rentals or shut-in rentals, or operations to maintain the lease on acreage
not in the unit where the unit is established by the lessee pursuant to
a clause of the lease. The lease covered 4314 acres, and portions of the
tract were included in six different units established by the Commissioner.
In 1979 and 1980 the lessee paid Pugh clause rentals for the portions
of the leased tract not in production. Three units had shut-in wells.
The lessee attempted to pay shut-in rental on the acreage covered by
these three units, but the check, through a typographical error, bore a
date more than ninety days beyond the cessation of production or
operation of the unit wells. Plaintiffs claimed the leases were cancelled
by failure to make shut-in payments timely under the Pugh clause.
Lessee defended on the basis that no payments were required since the
Pugh clause only pertained to units established by the lessee and not
to units established by the Commissioner of Conservation. The trial
court held for the defendant lessee.16 The plaintiffs appealed, and the
fifth circuit affirmed. Operations on the leased land sufficient to maintain
the lease according to its terms will normally continue the lease as to
its entirety. While this result may be modified by appropriate contract
terms, the Pugh clause here operated only as to units established by
35. 748 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1984).
36. 599 F. Supp. 14 (M.D. La. 1983), aff'd, 748 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1984).
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the lessee and not to those established by the Commissioner of Con-
servation. Drilling units established by the Commissioner are not "vol-
untary" actions of the lessee and therefore do not trigger the operation
of a Pugh clause.
While the result in Lowman is correct based on those particular
facts, the practitioner is cautioned to note that the case turns on the
language of the Pugh clause itself, as did Mathews, and not on a general
principle of law or conservation policy that units established by the
Commissioner of Conservation do not trigger a Pugh clause. That is
to say, a Pugh clause so drafted will be triggered into operation by a
unit, whether established by the lessee pursuant to the pooling clause
of a lease or by the Commissioner of Conservation.
D. Modified Pugh Clause; Continuous Drilling Operations Clause
In Roseberry v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co.,37 plaintiffs-
lessors brought suit against defendants-lessees seeking cancellation of the
portions of a lease outside of a unit. They relied on a lease provision,
a modified "Pugh clause," providing for continuation of the lease
beyond the primary term and any continuous drilling operations at the
expiration of the primary term only as to that acreage for which pro-
duction royalties were payable, even though there were one or more
wells on the leased property. The defendants claimed the lease was
continued by an additional well commenced with no cessation of op-
erations of more than ninety days between it and the well being drilled
on the unit at the end of the primary term. The trial court ruled that
the modified "Pugh clause" had the effect of dividing the lease at the
end of the primary term as to acreage outside a unit, and that the
"between operations" language of the "continuous drilling clause" re-
ferred to multiple operations on a continuous drilling operation and not
to multiple wells unless a subsequent well was the result of a cessation
of production or a dry hole. Thus, it held the lease had terminated as
to the acreage outside a drilling unit on which there were operations at
the end of the primary term. Defendants appealed. The Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed.
According to the court majority, the typewritten "Pugh clause"
implied that the lease would be divided, upon unitization. Since pro-
duction from a unit at the end of the primary term would maintain
the lease only as to the acreage included in that unit, to find that the
drilling operations conducted within a unit would hold all of the leased
acreage, whereas production from the same unit would not, would be
an absurd consequence. A dissenting judge read the Pugh clause to
apply to continuation of the lease beyond the primary term and any
continuous drilling operations period.
37. 470 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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The Roseberry case shows the difficulties that can be caused by
insertion of typewritten clauses in oil and gas leases when they must
interact with other printed provisions. While the holding of the principal
case is not clearly incorrect, the reading of the modified Pugh clause
by the dissenting judge Would also appear to have merit, even proceeding
from the rationale given by the majority of the court. The majority
opinion states that the
obvious intent of the inserted typewritten clause was to insure
that defendants would diligently attempt to explore and develop
all of the acreage encompassed within the lease. The defendants'
interpretation of this clause would effectively defeat the purpose
of the clause and would not be in accord with the clear intent
of the parties.
Here the court seems a bit wide of the mark, because with the dissenting
judge's reading of the clause, the provision would require that the
defendants begin drilling within ninety days on outside acreage to keep
the lease alive. The outside acreage could not be left idle even if the
unit well was then producing. Thus, diligent exploration and development
also follow from the dissenting judge's position. The problem partly
stems from the fact that unitization under Louisiana practice may take
place before there is a producing well as well as after there is production.
The problem posed by the majority position may be seen in the following
example.
Consider the possibility that a producing well on a leased tract of
500 acres would be included in a 160 acre unit covering only eighty
acres of the leased tract after the end of the primary term. What steps
could the lessee take at that point to maintain the lease as to the outside
420 acres? Under the rationale of the trial court, which was not disturbed
by the court of appeal, the well could not be said to have ceased
production nor to have been a dry hole, so the lessee would not have
the benefit of the continuous drilling clause to start a new well within
ninety days. The lessee would have to get a rig to begin drilling in
anticipation of the unit order which might or might not contain acreage
they anticipated to be put into a unit. This reading of the continuous
drilling clause puts the lessee into a real bind. Of course, the problem
may be said to be partially of the lessee's making, since most Pugh
clauses contain language allowing a period of time after inclusion'of a
portion of the lease into a unit to take steps to maintain the outside
acreage. And many continuous drilling clauses are written to make it
clear that additional wells may be commenced which will have the effect
of continuing the lease irrespective of the results of the operations taking
place at the end of the primary term.38
38. For a more complete discussion of the subject of "drilling operations" and
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EXECUTIVE RIGHT: DUTY TO LEASE
The second circuit held in Sparks v. Anderson39 that a landowner
who sold land for lignite development rather than lease it did not breach
a duty to a royalty owner who would have shared in the lease bonus
and royalty but had no share of the sale of land.
Plaintiff Sparks, a landowner, contracted to sell 512 acres to the
Andersons, reserving oil, gas, and other minerals. Before the title was
conveyed, a question arose as to whether lignite was a mineral under
the reservation. To resolve the issue, the parties agreed to an additional
reservation of sixty percent of the royalty under any future lease affecting
coal or lignite. After several negotiations with Phillips Coal Company
(including cancellation of a lease to Phillips that the Andersons had
signed before the actual conveyance of title to them by Sparks), the
Andersons decided not to lease the land to Phillips. Instead, they sold
Phillips 242 acres out of the 512 acres for $326,700, with the Andersons
also getting back from Phillips an agricultural lease for ten years on
the land. Sparks brought suit claiming that the Andersons had breached
a duty to him by their refusal to lease, and he sought damages in the
amount of at least the advance royalties which would have been paid.
The trial court, ruling for the plaintiff, concluded that the Andersons
and Phillips did not act in good faith towards Sparks, and their actions
were taken to avoid the payment of royalties to Sparks. The Andersons
appealed, and the second circuit reversed and rendered judgment for
them. The owner of an executive right is under no duty to lease, only
to act in good faith and in the same manner as a reasonably prudent
landowner whose interest is not burdened by a non-executive interest. 40
The Andersons did not breach this duty.
PARTITION
A. Necessity of Appraisal Prior to Sale
Partition of land where mineral rights are involved continues to be
a problem area under the Mineral Code. In Thigpen v. Boswell,41 it
was held that the Louisiana Mineral Code's appraisal of the rights to
be affected by a partition involving mineral rights must be made prior
to the sheriff's sale in order to extinguish the mineral rights.
Perrin was owner of certain property which he desired to partition.
He filed suit for partition by licitation. Thigpen, the owner of a servitude
"continuous drilling operations" clauses, see H. Williams & C. Meyers, 3 Oil and Gas
Law § 617 (Supp. 1984).
39. 465 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 538 (La. 1985).
40. La. R.S. 31:109 (1951).
41. 465 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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for one-third of the minerals of the property, was made a defendant.
Pursuant to the Mineral Code's provisions for partition by licitation of
land burdened by mineral rights created by fewer than all the owners,42
a notary was appointed to make the partition, and two appraisers were
to make separate appraisals of the property as a whole and of the
outstanding mineral servitudes. The property was sold at a sheriff's sale
prior to the appraisals being performed. Perrin purchased the property,
and, on the same day as he was deeded the tract, he deeded it to
Boswell without warranty as to the minerals. Thigpen brought this suit
for declaratory judgment to recognize him as owner of one-third of the
mineral rights. The trial court held for Boswell, and Thigpen appealed.
The court of appeal reversed. The Mineral Code procedures require that
the appraisals be made prior to the sale of the tract. Failure to comply
with the requirements results in the mineral rights not being extinguished
or otherwise affected by the sale.
B. Necessity of Common Elements of Ownership Where Land is
Subject to Mineral Rights
The case of Steele v. Denning43 holds that owners of an undivided
interest in land whose interest is burdened by a mineral servitude reserved
by a prior landowner may not provoke a partition of the land and the
mineral rights, as they do not hold a common element of ownership
with the servitude owner.
Plaintiff landowners brought suit for partition by licitation of land
and mineral interests. The defendants were the owner of the mineral
servitude burdening the plaintiffs' interests in the land, a mineral lessee,
and other property co-owners whose undivided interests were not subject
to mineral servitudes. The trial court ruled that the mineral lease was
conveyed by all co-owners and was attributable to the entire property;
thus, the lease would not be suject to the partition. However, the trial
court ordered a partition by licitation of the interests of the other parties.
The defendants appealed. The appellate court reversed this ruling insofar
as it would apply to the defendant who owned the mineral servitude;
it affirmed the trial court as to the other defendants, subject to the
exclusion of the mineral servitude from any partition by licitation. The
plaintiffs sought writs for review. The Louisiana Supreme Court af-
firmed. The court's position was that although the Louisiana mineral
servitude doctrine precludes creation of a mineral estate independent of
full title to the land, land subject to a mineral servitude may not be
partitioned by licitation with respect to the servitude because the land-
42. La. R.S. 31:178-184 (Supp. 1985).
43. 456 So. 2d 992 (La. 1984).
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owners do not hold a common element of ownership with the servitude
owner. Creation of a mineral servitude effectively fragments the title
such that different elements of ownership are held by different owners,
and there is not anything held in common between them.
Partition of land and mineral rights is a difficult area of Louisiana
mineral law. A handful of partition cases touching upon mineral rights
have been decided since the enactment of the Mineral Code in 1974. 41
The decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court here seems at odds with
the language of the Mineral Code. To understand the difficulty with
the case, one must start with the premise that one co-owner may not
lease land and have the lessee drill for oil or gas without the consent
of the other co-owners, but that a person owning a fractional mineral
servitude which is not a co-owned right does have the right to drill
without consent of others who may have a right to a share of the
production. 45 Partition is the means for a co-owner to divide the land
and thus have the right to develop without having to get the consent
of another. This combination of a "veto" power with the right of
partition avoids one owner being able to put the land to a use inconsistent
with the other owner's desired use.
If Steele is correct, it would appear to mean that one co-owner of
land could create a mineral servitude in a third party, and thereby defeat
the ability of the other co-owner to prevent his land from being used
for oil and gas purposes even through a partition of the land; since
the servitude owner would not be a co-owner, he presumably would be
able to exercise his right to drill after a partition, and he is likewise
not subject to a partition action. What is the landowner who does not
want drilling on his land to do? He did not take the land subject to
an outstanding mineral right, and he did not create the right that has
come into existence, but he is now burdened by the mineral servitude
and cannot get away from it through a partition action. The difficulty
of this proposition may prompt a subsequent court ruling to limit the
holding of Steele to its facts: here the parties seeking the partition are
44. See the Discussion Notes at 79 0. & G. R. 46; Patrick v. Johnstone, 361 So.
2d 894, 62 0. & G. R. 1737 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 600 (La. 1978);
Harmon v. Whitten, 390 So. 2d 962, 68 0. & G. R. 460 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 So. 2d 899 (La. 1980); Tri-State Concrete Co. v. Stephens, 406 So. 2d 205,-70
0. & G. R. 534 (La. 1981); Roberson v. Hollis, 403 So. 2d 845, 71 0. & G. R. 347
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Thibaut v. Thibaut, 407 So. 2d 466, 72 0. & G. R. 55 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 So. 2d 659 (La. 1981).
45. Article 169 of the Mineral Code provides: "Co-ownership does not exist between
the owner of a mineral right and the owner of the land subject to the right or between
the owners of separate mineral rights." La. R. S. 31:169 (1951). The cases referenced in
the comments to this article make it clear that under the Mineral Code consent does not




descendents in title to the person who purchased the interest in the land
subject to a reservation of mineral rights. The parties cannot complain
of the existence of a servitude burdening the land when they acquired
their interest. This would have more the flavor of an estoppel. The full
import of this decision cannot be assessed at this time.
INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION OF A MINERAL SERVITUDE
A. Effect of Unit Operations: Where Unit Well is Off the Servitude
Tract
1. Effect Where There is Agreement That Off-Tract Well Will
Interrupt Prescription
The court.in White v. Evans46 held that where the pooling agreement
so provides, production from a unit well will interrupt prescription as
to the entirety of the mineral servitude even if the unit well is off the
lease and only a portion of the lease is in the unit.
On October 2, 1934, A sold a servitude for one-half the minerals
on Blackacre (a tract of 120 contiguous acres) to B. A leased Blackacre
and 299 other acres to Placid in 1942, and four months later B executed
a co-lessor's agreement covering his one-half mineral servitude. In 1943
and 1944 Placid executed voluntary pooling agreements for two 640 acre
units, one of which included 40 acres of Blackacre. A and B both
signed the pooling agreements. On the unit that included the forty acre
portion of Blackacre, a well was spudded on June 7, 1944 (i.e. within
ten years of the servitude's creation), but the well was not on the
servitude property. The well was successful and has produced since then.
Landowners-plaintiffs, successors to A, brought suit to declare that
production from the well did not interrupt prescription against the eighty
acres of land burdened by the servitude which were not in the unit.
The trial court concluded that the pooling agreements should be inter-
preted as intending to interrupt prescription against the contiguous 120
acre servitude whether in or out of the unit. The plaintiffs appealed,
and the second circuit affirmed. Although contrary to the general rule
regarding the effect of unitization of a portion of a tract burdened by
a servitude, parties may agree expressly and in writing that an inter-
ruption of prescription by unit production shall extend to the entirety
of the servitude tract, wherever the location of the unit well and even
if only part of the servitude tract is within the unit. Here the landowner
and servitude owner expressly agreed in the pooling agreements that
production would interrupt prescription on the part of the servitude that
was not contained in the unit.
46. 457 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 462 So. 2d 207 (La. 1985).
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The reported case is a straightforward application of the Louisiana
Mineral Code provisions regarding the effect of unit operations on the
interruption of liberative prescription running against a mineral servitude.
Normally, the unit operations will interrupt prescription only as to that
portion in the unit if the unit well is not located on the tract burdened
by the servitude.4 7 However, the landowner and servitude owner may
agree that such unit operations will interrupt prescription as to the entire
servitude.4 8 This is the only instance in which the parties may make the
rules of prescription less onerous. The rights in question here were in
effect prior to the effective date of the Mineral Code, but the court
indicated that the pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence was not contrary to
the Mineral Code.
2. Effect Where There is No Agreement That Off-Tract Well
Will Interrupt Prescription
In a case involving facts analogous to those in White v. Evans but
without an agreement as to the effect of operations on interruption of
prescription, the court held that operations or production on a unit will
not interrupt prescription on that part of a servitude tract not included
within the unit, even if the rights were in existence prior to the enactment
of the Louisiana Mineral Code. This was the case of Sandefer & Andress,
Inc. v. Pruitt.4 9
In a concursus proceeding to determine the owners of mineral rights
in a sixty acre portion of a 260 acre tract, the landowners (the Pruitts)
asserted that a mineral servitude owned by certain mineral claimants
had been extinguished by ten years nonuse. The claimants tried to show
at trial that there had been production, but the trial court concluded
there was evidence that the wells in question had not produced for a
period of more than ten years. The claimants also asserted that unit
production had interrupted prescription, but none of the sixty acre
portion of the tract in question was in a unit for which there was
production. Thus, the trial court held for the landowners. The mineral
claimants appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. It was not
erfoneous for the trial court to conclude that there had been no pro-
duction from the tract in a twelve year period. And it was the law both
before and after the adoption of the Louisiana Mineral Code in 1974
that unit operations and production will interrupt prescription only as
to that portion of the servitude tract included in the unit if the unit
well is not on the tract burdened by the servitude. While a voluntary
pooling agreement may expressly provide that operations or production
47. La. R.S. 31:33, 34, 37 (1975).
48. La. R.S. 31:75 (1975).
49. 471 So. 2d 933 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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on a voluntary unit will interrupt prescription as to any affected servitude
tract in its entirety, the pooling agreements in question here did not
provide for this effect. Nor could agreements subsequent to the extin-
guishment of the servitude in question have had the effect of reviving
the servitude.
B. Retroactive Application of Statute Making Servitude
Imprescriptible
A statute making certain mineral servitudes imprescriptible does not
affect vested rights and thus does not impair the obligations of contract.
Therefore, it can be applied retroactively. This was the holding of the
second circuit court of appeal in Anadarko Production Co. v. Caddo
Parish School Board. 5 0
In 1954, Bryan sold eighty acres of land to the Caddo Parish School
Board with a reservation of mineral rights. In 1978 Anadarko took a
mineral lease on this acreage from the School Board, and in 1981 took
a lease from Bryan on the same acreage. After obtaining production,
Anadarko filed this concursus proceeding to determine which of the
lessors had a right to the royalty. The School Board claimed that Bryan's
interest reserved in 1954 had been lost through the liberative prescription
of ten years, since there had been no use of the servitude within that
period. Bryan claimed that a statute enacted in 1958, to make impres-
criptible mineral servitudes created when landowners reserved mineral
rights in a sale of land to school boards and other named agencies of
the state, had made her servitude imprescriptible. The trial court ruled
that the statute was not to be applied to servitudes already in existence
when the statute became effective, and thus her 1981 lease was inef-
fective. Bryan appealed, and the second circuit reversed. The servitude
created in the 1954 deed was not one for a definite term set by the
contract, but was instead a servitude of indefinite term that was subject
to the law of liberative prescription. The 1958 act applied, to the 1954
servitude because the ten year period had not accrued in 1958. Appli-
cation of the act in these circumstances does not affect vested rights
and does not impair the obligations of the contract. Therefore, Bryan
was entitled to the royalty as grantor of the valid lease.
The Anadarko case correctly distinguishes between statutes which
impair vested rights and those which merely prevent the operation of
a rule of prescription, a public policy in which no one has a vested
right. The only point to note here is the court's reference to the cod-
ification of the 1958 act as Article 149 of the Louisiana Mineral Code."
50. 455 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 460 So. 2d 610 (La. 1984).
51. La. R.S. 31:149 (1951).
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There are actually two Articles numbered 149 in the Mineral Code. Both
were 1980 amendments to the statute, and they do differ though not
in ways that would be applicable to the facts of the Anadarko case.
EXPROPRIATION
A. Surface Use: Valuation of Damages to Mineral Development
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nicholson,52 a case concerning
an expropriation of surface use of 300 acres of land for a railroad
yard, the court held that no damages could be awarded for loss of the
landowner's right to recover minerals where it was not shown that the
value of the mineral rights would be measurably diminished by the
restriction of surface access to the landowner.
Missouri Pacific Railroad brought an action for expropriation of
300 acres of plantation land to construct a railroad yard. The trial court
awarded the land to the railroad and fixed damages for the land, mineral
rights, and attorney fees. The landowner appealed the award of full
ownership of the land to the railroad and the amount of damages. The
first circuit court of appeal amended, affirmed in part, and reversed in
part; judgment was recast and rendered. The appellate court ruled that
the railroad needed only a servitude to the surface, and thus the railroad
did not take any mineral rights. The record did not show any restrictions
on the landowner's right to recover the minerals except that he might
have to drill directionally in order to exploit the minerals; there was
no showing that the value of the mineral rights had been measurably
diminished.
It should be observed that in Nicholson the landowner retained
considerable acreage around the area expropriated. Thus, the landowner
had access to land from which drilling could take place. Had this not
been the situation, a case could be made that loss of use of the surface
would also deprive the landowner of the ability to develop the minerals
since he would have no ability to control access for drilling from a
neighbor's property. Even with the facts of this case, it would appear
that lack of surface access to the 300 acres would make the mineral
rights less attractive to a potential lessee.
B. Gas Storage Reservoir; Prescription of Claims for Trespass and
Damages Incidental to Public Use; Compensation for Expropriation;
Extinction of Mineral Right by Confusion; Warranty Inapplicable to
Successor's Interest Where Warranty Excluded All Interests in Effect
and Recorded
An owner of a fractional mineral servitude who suffers a trespass
to his interest by a gas storage project is barred from asserting a claim




for trespass damages by a two year prescriptive period, but he is not
barred from asserting a claim for expropriation of the storage rights or
for the actual taking of recoverable hydrocarbons by that prescriptive
period. When that owner's servitude is extinguished by operation of the
principle of confusion upon his acquiring the rights to the land, he does
not lose his claim for expropriation, as the unencumbered ownership
interest became his through a reversion of the interest to the land and
because a tort claim would survive the extinction of the servitude interest.
A successor in interest is not bound by a gas storage agreement as to
all rights where that agreement excluded all interests in effect and
recorded as of the date of the agreement. These were the holdings of
the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mississippi River
Transmission Corp. v. Tabor.3
Mississippi River Transmission Corporation (MRT) entered into a
gas storage agreement with Tabor, Sr. in 1972 covering four tracts, but
excluded from warranty were all interests in effect and of record at the
time of the agreement. His son, Tabor, Jr., owned a fractional interest
in one tract and a part of the mineral interests in two other tracts
covered by the agreement, but Tabor, Jr. did not enter into the ageement.
In 1977 Tabor, Jr. came into full ownership of all four tracts. After
Tabor, Jr. became aware of MRT's activities on the property in 1978,
negotiations began between him and MRT. Thereupon, MRT filed for
declaratory judgment as to Tabor Jr.'s compensable interest in the four
tracts at the time of the agreement with Tabor Sr., and MRT also filed
for expropriation of any such interest through eminent domain. Tabor,
Jr. filed a counterclaim for damages for trespass and for compensation
for the lawful expropriation of his property. MRT's defenses to the
counterclaims were that any claims for trespass had been lost through
prescription, and that when Tabor, Jr.'s mineral interests in the tracts
were extinguished by confusion in 1977, MRT acquired all rights in the
property under the storage agreement with the father. The district court
held that Tabor, Jr.'s claims for the public use of his property had
prescribed, but that his claim for compensation for expropriation of his
rights had not prescribed. Both parties appealed.
The fifth circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. Tabor, Jr.'s
claims for damages incidental to the taking of the property prescribed
two years after the first occurrence of any damage under Louisiana
Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:5624. But this statute does not apply to
compensation for the value of property taken in an expropriation. La.
R.S. 19:2.1(B) provides a two year prescriptive period for claims arising
out of an expropriation, but the two year period begins to run only
after the interest has been legally expropriated, and this did not occur
53. 757 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1985).
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here until this suit began for expropriation. However, no additional
compensation is due for the taking of recoverable reserves because no
trespass occurred, and because the compensation for the actual taking
of Tabor, Jr.'s recoverable reserves is the same as his compensation for
the expropriation. His claims for expropriation were not lost through
the confusion that occurred in 1977 when he succeeded to his father's
interests in the four tracts which were subject to the storage agreement
with MRT because the warranty given by his father excluded all interests
in effect and of record when the agreement was made; thus, Tabor, Jr.
could not succeed to an obligation that was never imposed on his father
or upon his father's estate. And any rights reverting from the servitudes
that were extinguished reverted to Tabor, Jr. as owner of the land and
not to MRT.
